Since its unification, more than a century ago, Italy has experienced strong social and economical diversities between its southern and northern regions. In the last decades, Italy has undergone a severe economical and political crisis reflecting corruption at various levels of social stratification as well as a poor involvement of its population in the number of elections that occurred. This might be explained by a lack of confidence, or interest in the country as a whole, as if the primary social and political focus of its citizens could still lay at smaller regional scales, possibly evidencing the persistence of different cultural heritages. In order to shed lights on the possible existence of such heterogeneities, we perform a statistical-mechanics-driven analysis focusing on key social quantifiers, namely the evolution of autochthonous marriages (as family still plays as a fundamental brick in the edification of social aggregates) and of mixed marriages, namely those involving a foreign-born and a native (as migrant integration takes place at the collective level of the host communities), in order to compare the Italian outcomes with those of nearest EU nations as Spain, France and Germany. Our theoretical framework, predicting a square-root growth for the number of marriages versus the density of potential couples, nicely fits data for all considered countries. However, we find a homogeneous outline in all cases but Italy, the latter exhibiting two clearly detached squareroots, naturally pertaining to northern and southern regions, respectively. These findings suggest the existence of two culturally distinct communities, long-term lasting heritages of different, wellestablished cultures.
between the welfare and the soul of a population, and implies a profound difference between (northern and southern) customs and traditions, both intellectual and moral [17] .
While we would agree only partially to these words, and just point out that the Royal Theater of Saint Charles in Naples played as the oldest continuously active venue for public opera in the world (opening in 1737, decades before both the Milan's La Scala and Venice's La Fenice theaters), these words -date back to more than one century ago-may still capture the actual Italian scenario as local customs, dialects and traditions are still rooted along the peninsula and a drastic gap between northern and southern regions (maybe sustained by the peculiar geography of the country) is currently reported (see e.g., [12] ). Such diversification may justify the poor involvement of the population in the political scene as if the Italian citizens could not identify yet with a unique national structure and their socioeconomical interests lay at a smaller scale. In this paper we try to quantify these possible heterogeneities focusing on the evolution in the number of marriages contracted by its citizens. In fact, the attitude to marriage (and more generally to the family [24] ) along with other variables such as religious faith and political identification, seems to be strongly related to the cultural heritage of a nation and, as already evidenced in the past [25] , its estimate throughout the peninsula can highlight that, despite rapid changes, a true convergence between northern and southern mores has not been achieved yet.
More precisely, under very minimal hypotheses, in the following we present a statistical-mechanics approach for deriving, under the hypothesis of homogeneity, a close-form expression for the evolution of the number of marriages as a function of the number of potential couples present in the territory. Its comparison with data is not fully satisfactory for Italy, yet it successfully holds for other neighboring countries (i.e., France, Germany and Spain). Remarkably, however, by treating Northern and Southern Italy as two distinct countries, the match between theoretical predictions and data is plenty recovered, clearly highlighting the persistence of these heterogeneities. Finally, this picture is further corroborated by analyzing the evolution of the number of "mixed marriages", for which analogous outcomes for all the countries considered are found.
II. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The statistical mechanical approach to the investigation of social complexity consists in a bulk of stochastic techniques developed to model the underlying self-interacting network (whose nodes are single decision makers and links mirror the existence of pair-wise interactions) in order to figure out its emergent features, being firmly grounded on the law of large numbers, on the minimum energy and maximum entropy principles [15] . Although this perspective implies a certain degree of simplification, its reward lies in its crucial ability to unveil robust collective behaviors. In fact, in the last decade, a massive usage of statistical mechanics, driven by quantitative sociology, has allowed extracting from available data-sets a big deal of descriptive as well as predictive information successfully applied in marketing and financial services [20] , telecommunications [27] , health-care and pharmaceutical [9] , traveling optimization [19] , migrant's integration in host society [1, 5] and many other fields of social complexity [14, 16, 18] .
Here, we develop a statistical mechanical model to describe the evolution in the number of marriages in a given country as a function of its population. By calibrating this model versus available demographic data, we aim to highlight the possible persistence of different cultural traits among northern and southern regions of Italy. The robustness of the result is checked by performing analogous analysis for nearest EU states, namely Spain, France and Germany.
In the following we provide a streamlined description of the outcomes of our model, while we refer to Section Methods and to Ref. [1, 6] for more details.
First, we need to fix the degree of resolution at a certain territorial district, in such a way that different districts are considered as independent realizations of the same system; this also implies that the number of marriages in a given district is taken to depend only on the population within the district itself. We decide to fix the resolution at the provincial level, as its extent is typically broad enough to justify the hypothesis of independence [1, 6] , yet the number of provinces is large enough to get a reasonable pool for the statistical analysis.
We call N P the total amount of provinces for the country considered (N P = 110 for Italy, N P = 476 for Germany, N P = 53 for Spain, and N P = 96 for France, see also [26] ), each labeled with an index α, namely α = 1, ..., N P . Also, we call M α and F α the amount of males and of females, respectively, within the province α. Being N = N P α (M α +F α ) the total amount of citizens in the whole country, we can further define the relative percentages of males and females as γ α = M α /N and 1 − γ α = F α /N , respectively.
Then, the amount of marriages LW α (i.e. local weddings) within the province α turns out [1, 6] to depend on the square-root of Γ α ≡ γ α (1 − γ α ), and, under the assumption of homogeneity, the same holds for marriages LW at the country level where γ = α γ α and LW = ( N P α LW α )/N P . Now, we proceed by extracting data series from the available sources (respectively ISTAT for Italy, DESTATIS for Germany, INE for Spain, and INSEE for France), and then, through a careful protocol for information extrapolation during data analysis, we infer LW (γ) for comparison with Eq. 1. We refer to section Methods for an explanation of the theoretical and experimental routes followed, while here we directly discuss our findings.
As shown in Figure One , the predicted behaviour (1) successful matches data for all the European countries considered but Italy. If analyzed as a single homogeneous set, data for Italy are too noisy to detect any clear trend; however, by treating data for Southern Italy and for Northern Italy separately (as if they were two different countries), the expected behaviour suddenly emerges, suggesting that, at least as far as this particular social quantifier is concerned, historical traditions have not mixed yet. It is worth noticing that, to obtain this result, we split Italy in such a way that the R 2 of the related fits are maximal (as shown in Figure Two) , and this division turns out to coincide with the definition of norther and souther Italy as reported in Eurostat.
III. METHODS

A. A theoretical reference framework
In this section we summarise the theory leading to Eq. 1; here we report only the key logical steps seeking for self-consistency, while we refer to [1, 6] for a detailed derivation.
We introduce an Hamiltonian (i.e., a cost function) H, describing the interaction pattern among males and females [30] . Each individual i is associated to a dichotomic variable or "spin" (referred to as σ i = ±1 for males and as τ i = ±1 for females) encoding a positive (i.e. +1) or negative (i.e. −1) attitude to marriage. Then, the "cost" of a given configuration ({σ}, {τ }) is provided by the global Hamiltonian
where α labels the various provinces, N P is the total number of provinces in the country, and
is the total population in the whole country. This Hamiltonian is the sum of terms like −σ i τ j over all the possible couples (i, j) of individuals belonging to the same province. Intuitively, for the minimum energy principle (that tries to keep the numerical value of H({σ}, {τ }) at its minimum [15] ), the function (2) tries to favor the configurations of citizens with the overall lowest possible frustration, that is, considering the couple (i, j) as an example, it favors the two states where the variables σ i and τ µ are aligned, thus σ i = τ j = +1 and σ i = τ j = −1, while misaligned couples σ i = τ j are unfavored. This assumption captures the trivial observation that in these societies stable couples (σ i = τ j = +1) exist as well as, somehow less intuitive yet largely predominant, stable not-couples (σ i = τ j = −1). On the other hand, the conflicting situation where one of the two partners wants to get married (sat σ i = +1) but the other does not (hence τ µ = −1) is only transitory (hence not stable) as after a proper timescale, the pretender is expected to move toward another target.
Once the model is defined, that is we have an explicit expression for H({σ}, {τ }), we can automatically assign a probabilistic weight (i.e., the Maxwell-Botlzmann distribution ρ ∝ exp[−H({σ}, {τ })]) to each possible configuration and therefore estimate the likelihood for the establishment of a given number of marriages. This allows to introduce the partition function Z N for the model is
where the sum is performed over all possible
Fα configurations. By a direct calculation, it is straightforward to check that
where we highlighted the term m α = (
Mα i
σ i )/M α , which measures the average propensity to marry for males within the province α. This quantity works as the "order parameter" of the model and it is expected to be proportional to the experimental amount of marriages LW α within the province α (suitably normalized). Note that, in order to study the joint evolution of males and females attitudes at wedding, the requirement of heterosexual weddings (constraint imposed by the Italian laws -as in Italy homosexual marriages are forbidden-and respected during data acquisition) implicitly allows to study the average propensity of only one of the two sex (male here, via m α ).
Before proceeding it is worth stressing the social meaning of the last and crucial passage in eq. (4) [31] : this equivalence is trivially obtained by performing the summation over the τ variables (i.e., by integrating over the "female degrees of freedom"), that returns a term ∼ cosh( √ M α Γ α m α ) due to the Eulero formula; the latter is then written as cosh(x) = exp[ln cosh(x)] and then Taylor-expanded at the leading term as exp[ln cosh(x)] ∼ exp(x 2 /2).
Remarkably, such an equivalence states that the initial model described by eq. (2), where males and females interact trying to satisfy their relationships, recovers the Copy Model Theory, that is, the Discrete Choice with imitation [10, 11] -namely the extension of the McFadden econometric theory [7] to interacting decision makers-in Socio-Economic Literature or Hebbian Ferromagnetism in Statistical Mechanics Literature [2] [3] [4] . Of course, and in complete analogy, we could reach imitation among females only, by summing over the σ variables first. Now, Discrete Choices with imitation, where agents (here males) interact pair-wise in an imitative fashion, is well known in statistical mechanics (as the Curie-Weiss model [3] ) as well as in quantitative sociology (as the BrockDaurlauf theory [13] ): for this model the expected behavior of the order parameter m versus the tuneable parameter Γ = γ · (1 − γ) results in the following equation
with a constant irrelevant to the present problem. By Taylor-expanding the above equation for small m we get m ∼ √ Γ and, identifying trough the Law of Large Numbers the theoretical m with the experimental LW , namely by writing LW ∝ m, we obtain the expected leading trend, namely
withã another constant irrelevant to the purposes of the present work. This equation predicts, within each country (namely under the assumption of homogeneity among the σ as well as the τ variables), a square-root growth for the expected number of marriages LW versus the density of potential couples Γ and can be compared directly with experimental data.
B. An experimental reference framework After binning both the datasets we check that at least one of them, migrant's density versus time, is monotonic so to allow the inversion that returns time versus migrant's density (not shown). Then time is removed from our data by plotting -as raw data-marriages versus migrant's density as shown in the central panel. Lastly we bin the latter to obtain the coarse grained evolution of the phenomenon, whose spots (yellow circles) have been best fitted against the theory (red line).
We collected data for the number of marriages and for the female and male populations in Italy (source: ISTAT), France (source: INSEE), Spain (source: INE) and Germany (source: DESTATIS) over the time window 2000 − 2010. We fixed the degree of resolution at the provincial level: this choice is determined by the empirical observation that marriages typically involve people living in the same province (i.e., the social interactions display a characteristic geographic scale [1] ); further, this in turn allows to treat each province independently from the others and thus implies a statistical analysis over P different realizations.
Therefore, for each province α we collected the data series {Γ α (y)} and {LW α (y)}, where data are sampled yearly, being y = 2000, ..., 2010. Data manipulation is a lengthy but simple protocol largely discussed in [1, 6] and summarized in Figure Three . This allows getting the average evolution of LW versus Γ. Such values are then best-fitted against Eq. 6 as shown in Fig. 1 .
As it appears evident even by direct visual inspection of Figure One , for France, Spain and Germany there is a remarkable agreement between the theory and the data, while Italian marriages behave substantially differently: two well-separated square roots emerge and, quite remarkably, these are built by the northern and southern provinces, respectively. This is confirmed quantitatively by the fitting analysis reported in the tables of Figure Two.
FIG. 4:
From the top left proceeding clockwise plots belonging to Germany, Spain, Italy and France are presented. Raw data on both the y and x axis were normalised with respect to the total number of weddings and total population size respectively for each year taken into account. The error circles should be understood with respect to the legend reported in each graph. In order to establish a direct comparison among the states, all the plots which are shown were realised dividing the interval of data in 30 bins. As it is clear from the plots, Italy is best fitted by two square roots curves.
C. A robust framework
Finally, in order to check robustness of our results, marriages between native and foreign-born citizens have been analyzed in a similar fashion. The theoretical framework underlying this kind of phenomenology is analogous to the one described above, but here the two parties are played by native and by foreign-born individuals (rather than males and females, respectively); we refer to [1, 6] for a full treatment. The expected behavior for mixed weddings M W is therefore described by the function
where ρ is the fraction of native people within the whole population, Γ = ρ · (1 − ρ) and b,b are two constant irrelevant to the present work.
We checked the theoretical law (7) versus experimental data for the above mentioned four countries. The nice agreement for Spain, France and Germany suggests that the attitude toward a possible partnership with a foreign-born citizen can be looked as the result of imitative mechanisms within native people only (as deepened in [6] ). Moreover, the peculiar behavior outlined for Italian data corroborates the previous analysis, confirming strong discrepancies between northern and southern regions even as for immigrant integration.
